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Is there any good reason from within moral cosmopolitanism to limit
immigration into political societies? A morally cosmopolitan view
asserts that the fundamental norms of justice that ground the legitimacy
and justice of the political communities of modern states are ones that
hold for the whole world community. And whether one holds to liberal
egalitarian or classical liberal cosmopolitan principles, the initial impulse of
cosmopolitans is to assert that political societies do not have a right to
limit immigration into political communities. Each person is entitled on
these views to equality of opportunity or freedom of movement
respectively and thereby is entitled to move into, or avail themselves of
the opportunities in, any political society. Hence cosmopolitanism would
appear, on its face, to imply that open borders are required by justice.
* Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Arizona. I want to thank
Fernando Teson for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also thank
Andrew Williams for discussion of some of the ideas.
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And yet, though we do not know what the consequences of such policies
would be, many find the prospect of such policies to be unsettling or
even frightening. Many citizens of liberal democracies are unsettled by
even the modest immigration flows they see into their societies. The
reasons for this anxiety are presumably many. One is fear of loss of control
over the community, of living in a society of mutually uncomprehending
strangers. Some are concerned that open immigration would leave
unfinished the project of bringing social justice to their own society.
Another may be simple xenophobia. The first two of these considerations
are legitimate ones, though they may not be decisive; others are illegitimate.
What place do these kinds of considerations have within a moral
cosmopolitan view?
In this paper, I want to suggest one important way to take the above
issues seriously that is consistent with a thoroughgoing cosmopolitanism.
The idea develops a consideration that has been discussed, but not
sufficiently explored, by some cosmopolitans.1 It starts from the
observation that one can be a moral cosmopolitan without being a
political cosmopolitan in the sense of advocating for a global political
community in the near-term future. To be sure, given the role of the
political community in establishing justice among persons, it seems clear
that in the long term, moral cosmopolitans must hope for a global
political community. In the near-to-medium term, however, efforts to
establish a global political community would be quite premature and
would probably lead to the kinds of oppression and anomie that Kant
worried about.2 Still, the aspiration to a global political community in
the long run and the steps necessary to achieve this aim may give us
some guidance as to how to think about the migration of peoples from
the point of view of moral cosmopolitanism.
The basic idea of this paper starts from the observation that the
modern liberal democratic state represents an essential achievement in
the attempts of human beings to realize justice and the common good
among themselves. Its achievements are not all we want them to be, and
they are limited to the scope of people brought into its jurisdiction. But
considering the long and wretched history of human oppression, they are
achievements that must attract our respect. Furthermore, the modern
democratic state embodies the best hope we have of ultimately bringing
justice to the whole of humanity. It is an essential example for global

1. See Joseph H. Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective,
in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND
OF MONEY 25 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992).
2. See IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace, in ON HISTORY 85, 113–14 (Lewis
White Beck ed., 1963).
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institutions and the basic building block on which such global institutions
can be created. Liberal democratic states are responsible for the modern
development of international institutions that protect and regulate
international trade, provide for collective security, and aspire to realize
some collective goods such as the protection of the environment and the
relief of poverty and disease. And international institutions are maintained
by such democratic states through their example and practices. My surmise
is that these institutions would not last long without the sponsorship of
liberal democratic states. This leads me to argue that, insofar as the
development of global political institutions and ultimately the development
of a global political community are essential to the realization of the
aims of the moral cosmopolitan, the modern liberal democratic state
must play a central role. And to the extent that it is necessary to this
development, we must protect such states from forces that would
undermine their democratic character and the normal functioning of
their political systems. Immigration policy should therefore be in part
evaluated in terms of whether it undermines the existence and normal
practices of liberal democratic states. To the extent that open borders would
undermine the existence or normal functioning of liberal democratic
states, such a policy should be rejected from a cosmopolitan standpoint
because it derails the very institutions that give us some hope for
realizing cosmopolitan justice in the future.
As a start, it is important to discuss the basis of some noncosmopolitan
conceptions of justice and political community. I will discuss two different
conceptions of the relationship between political community and distributive
justice that have played a role in the debate. In the first account of this
relationship, distributive justice consists of a set of principles independent
of political community, and political community has the function of
trying to realize and establish distributive justice among the persons
within it. This “functional” account of the relationship between justice
and political community is historically associated with John Locke.3
The job of the political community, according to this view, is to realize
principles that apply to persons independent of the political community.
In the second account, distributive justice consists of a set of principles
3. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 395–99 (Peter Laslett ed., The
New Am. Library, Inc. 1965) (1690). The functional conception is independent of any
particular principles of justice. Locke’s principles were a kind of qualified classical
liberalism, while many contemporary cosmopolitans espouse egalitarian principles of
distributive justice. See, e.g., Carens, supra note 1, at 25.
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that only arise within the context of the political community and because
of the particular features of the relationships among persons within the
political community.4 Examples of this account are some recent liberal
nationalist and contractual views about the nature and basis of political
community. The participation in political community is partly constitutive
of distributive justice in this view. The relationships in which people
stand towards each other in the political community are what give rise
to considerations of distributive justice. I will call this the “constitutive”
conception of the relationship between political community and
distributive justice.
First, I want to examine some recent arguments for the constitutive
conception of the relationship between political community and distributive
justice. This kind of view has been defended by liberal nationalists such as
David Miller,5 and in part by Michael Walzer6 and political contractualists
such as Michael Blake,7 Stephen Macedo,8 and Thomas Nagel.9 In this
paper, I will critically assess the contractualist arguments but not the
liberal nationalist ones; the latter merit a full length treatment of their
own. The contractualist arguments attempt to show that, although we owe
respect for the basic human rights of all persons, there is no reason to
think that principles of equality of opportunity or equality in material
distribution ought to regulate our relations with all the peoples of the
globe. The existence of a shared political community is a necessary condition
for the obligations of distributive justice to hold among persons. It is
in this respect that these views are not cosmopolitan. They do recognize
obligations that people hold towards each other just by virtue of being
fellow humans, and some of these views hold that there are human rights
correlative with duties on the part of all persons.10 But these thinkers
hold back from the thesis that distributive justice is owed to all human
beings. Distributive justice has a kind of restricted scope, limiting the
4. A fourth recent view asserts that political communities as we know them are
voluntary associations or clubs. Defenders of this view argue that political communities
should be able to control immigration just as clubs can control entry. I will not be able
to address this view in this paper. See Christopher H. Wellman, Freedom of Association
and Immigration, ETHICS (forthcoming Oct. 2008).
5. See DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2007).
6. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 31–35, 61–63 (1983).
7. See Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257 (2001).
8. See Stephen Macedo, The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy: Open
Borders Versus Social Justice?, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 63, 69–76 (Carol M. Swain
ed., 2007).
9. See Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113
(2005).
10. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 163–200.
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targets of the obligations to fellow citizens or members of the political
community. This relationship of norms of distributive justice to the
political community is what characterizes the constitutive conception
of the political community.
This conception of political community has enormous implications for
immigration because it is the concern for cosmopolitan distributive
justice that leads to the cosmopolitan demand for open borders.11 The
thought is that cosmopolitan justice requires equality of opportunity for
all persons and that this can be achieved only if all persons have access
to participation in the wealthy economies and stable political societies of
the world. For example, the coercive exclusion of large numbers of poor
persons from Africa and Latin America from participation in the wealthy
economies of Europe and North America seems clearly to violate the
fundamental norm of equality of opportunity as understood in a
cosmopolitan sense.
To be clear, none of the thinkers above argue that immigration should
be completely restricted. They all hold that there are duties of humanitarian
assistance that may require allowing either economic or political refugees
into a country, even possibly as citizens. And a number have argued that
refugees and legitimate asylum seekers have rights to be admitted into
some—though not every—political society that will protect their basic
human rights.
In this paper, I discuss two recent contractualist arguments that defend
the constitutive conception of the relation between political community
and distributive justice and the consequent right of political communities
to engage in limited exclusion of poor immigrants into their society. I
argue that the case has not been made for differentiated moral obligations
towards fellow citizens and human beings generally. I then elaborate an
alternative functional conception of political community that accepts the
idea that standards of distributive justice hold for the whole world.
Ultimately, this implies that the long-term aim of humanity must be to
have a global political community. That said, we must not produce a
global political community prematurely. The way forward is through
the creation of international institutions by liberal democratic states
which have achieved limited political communities. Although it will
11. See, e.g., Carens, supra note 1, at 25. For a very interesting effort to show that
cosmopolitans need not accept open borders to satisfy equal opportunity, see Eric
Cavallero, An Immigration-Pressure Model of Global Distributive Justice, 5 POL., PHIL.
& ECON. 97 (2006).
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take a very long time, this is the process by which a legitimate global
political community can be created. This gives some reason for cosmopolitans
to consider limitations on immigration into democratic societies. Because
democratic societies are the key to the creation of a global political
community, it is essential that they be protected from threats to their
maintenance and proper functioning. After discussing some empirical
arguments to this effect, I conclude with a discussion of a further difficulty
with the particular argument I offer and relate it to some general problems
of non-ideal theory in global political theory.
Let me say a little bit about the method I follow here. The argument
of this paper is only hypothetical. It asserts that if large-scale immigration
into democratic societies were to undermine the proper functioning of those
societies, then there would be good cosmopolitan reasons for limiting
immigration. But the empirical evidence is not definitive, in my mind,
so we must await more conclusive evidence. In part I am engaging in
straightforward moral and political philosophy. But I am also engaging
in a kind of speculative social science. In my view, political philosophy
must engage in speculative social science to some significant degree.
Political philosophy inevitably makes assertions about political institutions
and their functioning. We must try to marshal the available empirical
evidence in support of these assertions, and where the evidence is
inconclusive, we must suggest what empirical hypotheses are relevant
to the normative political project we are engaged in. In a sense, political
philosophers are partly engaged in the building of models of just and
legitimate political institutions or of the ways in which to bring about
such institutions. The validity of these models depends in part on a
priori reasoning and in part on empirical theories. Political philosophers
can contribute to the development of social science by suggesting what
kinds of empirical hypotheses need support given a basic normative
theory.
I. CONTRACTUALIST DEFENSES OF A NONCOSMOPOLITAN
CONCEPTION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY
The basic idea behind contractualist arguments is that the members of
a political community are owed justification for the terms of the political
community. Persons who are not members of the community are not
owed such justification. The second main premise states that the duty to
justify coercive institutions to fellow members implies that one must
advance principles for the governance of society that they can accept as
free and equal persons. The third main premise of the argument states
that a scheme of egalitarian distribution of material goods—in a broad
sense of “egalitarian distribution,” which might allow inequalities in
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distribution but only for the common good—is a necessary component
of an adequate justification of coercion to fellow free and equal members of
the community.12 Moreover, because nonmembers are not owed such
justification, there is no duty to invoke principles of egalitarian distributive
justice in justifying one’s relations to nonmembers.
Thomas Nagel and Michael Blake give somewhat different arguments
for the first and second main premises of this argument. Blake argues
that because the state coerces individuals, it interferes with the autonomy
of persons and therefore owes them a justification that would be sufficient
for them to hypothetically consent to the coercion.13 This is a kind of
variant of Locke’s requirement of consent to the coercive authority of
the state, but it comes with some twists not contemplated by Locke.
First of all, it requires only hypothetical consent and not actual consent.
Second, it turns out that the hypothetical consent will not be forthcoming
unless a number of ambitious principles of distributive justice also
constrain and guide state action. We are told that individuals will only
hypothetically accept the coercive authority of the state if the state assures
an egalitarian distribution of political power, equality of opportunity,
and an egalitarian distribution of material resources. Now, this latter
claim is itself never defended, save for a brief and noncommittal allusion to
Rawls’s argument from the original position. Blake assures us that we
need not accept Rawls’s argument from the original position for the
difference principle.14 This is all to the good because I do not think many
have been convinced that the original position argument gives much
support for the difference principle over utilitarianism or a guaranteed
minimum. But Blake never supplies us with any further argument for
the idea that hypothetical consent will not be forthcoming unless a set of
highly ambitious distributive principles are put into place. As far as I
can tell, it seems that no good argument can be made here. The reason
why I am discussing this apparent failure is because I do not see how
Blake can show that there is any reason to think that the moral principles
that govern the state are different from those that should govern all
human beings. Hypothetical consent does not seem to have the power to
generate determinate principles at all.
12. It should be noted that the third premise is not necessary to the constitutive
approach. One could be a classical liberal and still hold that there are some special
duties relating to justice owed to one’s fellow citizens that are not owed to others.
13. See Blake, supra note 7, at 272–84.
14. Id. at 283–84.
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More importantly, it is not clear why principles of justice ought to
arise out of this kind of hypothetical consent. We are, after all, talking
about the consent of an individual to a particular state’s authority. Why
would this consent not simply be regulated by the usual rational and
moral norms that have authority over a person? To see this, think of the
generative power of actual consent. Though actual consent does produce
special duties, it does not generate new principles of justice. It merely
produces obligations to support or not to interfere with what one has
consented to. If I have consented to Amnesty International taking money
out of my bank account, I may have an obligation not to interfere, but I
have not produced a new principle of justice that says Amnesty may
withdraw funds from my account. It is hard to see how hypothetical
consent could have any more generative power than actual consent. And
so, it is not clear how hypothetical consent can generate special principles
of justice.15
Another argument for this point is more internal to Blake’s position.
The problem I have in mind becomes evident when we see that coercive
relationships take place everywhere among persons in the world. Not
only does the state coerce its citizens, it coerces all persons in the world
with respect to the things that come under its jurisdiction. No one may
violate my property rights as they are established by the political society
of which I am a part, and all the rights I have as a citizen are protected
against all persons, not merely fellow citizens. And, of course, the
borders of a territory are coercively enforced as well. Furthermore, the
world as a whole is organized in terms of territorial states, each of which
has similar rights of coercion against all persons. To the extent that this
whole system is sanctioned by international law and recognized as legitimate
by virtually all states, it is an unmistakably unified and distributed
scheme of coercion. All these acts of coercion against the world, and the
whole system of such actions, would seem to call for hypothetical consent
on the account Blake has given us. And if we do require hypothetical
consent, why would it not be possible to have the same considerations
carry the day in the case of the world as in the case of a domestic
society? It is simply not clear why this larger perspective is not one that
ought to have priority over more local perspectives.
I am not advocating for the application of a Rawlsian original position
argument for the world; I do not think that such arguments yield clear
15. A final point on the relation between consent, coercion, and justice should be
noted here. It is clear that the consent of the coerced is not required for the vast majority
of acts of coercion. Each and every human being is protected by a standing threat of
unpleasant consequences if someone contemplates harming, interfering with, or
mistreating a protected person in some way. Yet, it is unreasonable to think that the
consent of the coerced is needed to validate this coercion.
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conclusions. I am simply arguing that it is not at all clear that this idea,
that hypothetical consent is called for when people are coerced in a
systematic manner, is going to yield the kind of differentiated morality
that Blake is recommending.
Blake gives a kind of intuitive application of his argument in the case
of immigration.16 He argues by means of a contrast between the
distribution of political power and the rights of entry and exit from a
political community. He asks us to consider an argument, adopted from
Joseph Carens, asserting that it is a violation of moral equality if someone
from Buffalo is able to move to Boston without any impediment, while
someone from Toronto is not permitted to move to Boston without
significant efforts to acquire a residency permit. This seems like a
violation of equality. The person from Buffalo is being treated in some
way better than the person from Toronto and for a reason that seems
arbitrary from a moral point of view: where they are currently citizens.
Blake contrasts this example with the case of the person from Buffalo
having some say over the decisions of the federal government of the
United States, while the person from Toronto has no such say. This,
Blake asserts, is no problem because the person from Buffalo must share
burdens with other U.S. citizens and is subject with them to the authority
of the federal government, while the person from Toronto is not. There
is no reason to distribute political power to the person from Toronto.
The justification owed to the person from Buffalo for the burdens
imposed on him, and the coercion he is subject to, must include an offer
of equal political rights as part of the bargain. And because the person
from Toronto is not subject to these burdens and duties, she is not owed
such a justification, and therefore, is not owed equal political rights.
Blake’s inference is that “Carens now has no argument as to why the
right to mobility should be treated as something which is always an
implication of moral equality, rather than a specific implication of moral
equality which applies only within the context of shared liability to the
state.”17 The thought is that, just as the state owes different justifications
to citizens and noncitizens in the case of the distribution of political
power, so it owes different justifications in the case of freedom of
movement.

16. See Michael Blake, Immigration, in A COMPANION TO APPLIED ETHICS 224, 228
(R. G. Frey & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2003).
17. Id. at 229.

941

CHRISTIANO.PRINTER.DOC

11/25/2008 1:59:11 PM

I agree with Blake’s observation about the justice of distributing
political power. But I am not convinced that his inference from this
observation is correct. A very different interpretation of the case can be
given. In the normal case, giving the person from Toronto equal
political power over the actions of the U.S. federal government may be
incompatible with a proper appreciation of the requirements of equality
in distribution. It would amount to distributing equal political power to
someone who does not have overall equal stakes in the decisionmaking.
People from outside a country are not normally affected by a state’s
policies and laws to the same degree as people from within a political
society. People within a political society, because of the internal development
of the state over several hundred years, tend to share in each other’s fate
a great deal more than those without this shared history. To be sure, this
does not hold in absolutely every case. However, I believe it is fair to
say that for the most part, people who are members of modern states
tend to have roughly equal stakes in their states, while those who are not
members have lesser stakes.
Under the principle that those who have very significantly unequal
stakes in some community ought not to have an equal say over that
community, it would seem unfair for the person from Toronto to have
the same political power over the U.S. government as the person from
Buffalo. But this argument is grounded in equality. It is because
these persons are equal, and have equal claims to their interests being
advanced, that they ought not to have an equal say over what happens in
communities where they have very unequal stakes. The very same set of
considerations applies within political societies. One reason for blocking
the application of democratic decisionmaking to the exercise of basic
individual liberties is that outsiders have much less of a stake in whom I
associate with, or what I do with my free time, than I do. The principle
that underpins the lesser political rights of the person from Toronto over
the decisions of the U.S. federal government is a principle of equality in
distribution, either of welfare or of opportunity. And that is the very
same principle that suggests to many that the inhabitants of poor countries
ought to have open access to the economies of rich countries.
Let us consider another case Blake mentions. He argues that by virtue
of the authority exercised over citizens, the state owes citizens basic civil
liberties.18 These too are part of the basic package of things to be
included in a justification to free and equal persons with shared
liabilities to the state. The thought seems to be that the state only owes
this justification to its citizens. However, I see no good argument for the

18.
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thesis that the state owes greater respect for the civil rights of citizens
than it does for noncitizens. Certainly once noncitizens enter the state’s
territory, the state must protect their civil rights as well. For example, I
do not think it would be legitimate for the state to restrict the movement
of noncitizens who are in the country legally, except perhaps for very
special cases involving foreign policy. In sum, I do not think that Blake
has made his case against a completely cosmopolitan account of the
duties of distributive justice.
Although Blake invokes the idea of shared liability to political
authority, Nagel stresses the importance of authority acting in the name
of the citizens.19 Citizens are the ultimate authority in the society and
are owed a justification for the existence of the state and the state’s
activities by virtue of the fact that the state acts in their names and enlists
their cooperation to pursue its aims. Here it is the required engagement
of the will or agency of the citizens in the activities of the state that
entails the need to justify the state’s action to them. And this engagement of
the will or agency of citizens holds even if the state is imposed or is
dictatorial. Any state “purports not to rule by force alone. It is providing
and enforcing a system of law that those subject to it are expected to
uphold as participants, . . . . Since their normative engagement is required,
there is a sense in which it is being imposed in their name.”20 The
relationship to distributive justice—indeed to justice generally—is then
laid out:
Insofar as those institutions admit arbitrary inequalities, we are, even though the
responsibility has been simply handed to us, responsible for them, and we
therefore have standing to ask why we should accept them. This request for
justification has moral weight even if we have in practice no choice but to
live under the existing regime. The reason is that its requirements claim our
active cooperation, and this cannot be legitimately done without justification—
otherwise it is pure coercion.21

Nagel argues that individuals do not owe such justification to those
outside the political community. Rather, they owe no more than respect
for basic human rights. And Nagel applies this idea directly to the
question of immigration:

19.
20.
21.

See Nagel, supra note 9, at 128–29.
Id. at 129 n.14.
Id. at 129.
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The immigration policies of one country may impose large effects on the lives
of those living in other countries, but under the political conception that by itself
does not imply that such policies should be determined in a way that gives the
interests and opportunities of those others equal consideration. Immigration
policies are simply enforced against the nationals of other states; the laws are
not imposed in their name, nor are they asked to accept and uphold those laws.
Since no acceptance is demanded of them, no justification is required that
explains why they should accept such discriminatory policies, or why their
interests have been given equal consideration. It is sufficient justification to
claim that the policies do not violate their prepolitical human rights.22

These are highly suggestive and tantalizing phrases, but it is not clear
what they mean. Nagel seems to think that outside the context of the
state, some kind of modified libertarianism is correct. We owe duties of
noninterference and nonharming, as well as some duties of beneficence,
to foreigners. But when we join together in a political community, new
duties arise that were not present before. Because we are responsible for
the activities of the state, we are owed a justification of its activities.
And in particular, we are owed a justification for various inequalities
that arise through the state’s activities because we are responsible for the
inequalities. And because we are responsible for the inequalities, we
must now be concerned with the inequality even though had we not been
responsible for them we would not have been required to be concerned
about inequality. The key issue here seems to be the relationship of
responsibility for inequality and a requirement to be concerned with
inequality. Nagel’s approach suggests that it is only because we are
responsible for the inequality that we become duty bound to attempt to
alleviate it.
It is important to be clear on the notion of responsibility here. It is not
responsibility in the sense of duty; the relationship above would not be
very interesting were that the notion of responsibility in play. Instead,
one who is responsible for an act is capable of being blameworthy or
praiseworthy for that action. A moral agent is responsible for an act
when she knowingly and intentionally performs it. She is then, at least
in principle, capable of being praised or blamed for it, though it may turn
out that neither praise nor blame is called for. Praise and blame are
enabled by responsibility. Let us call this the attributive sense of
responsibility. My question is: can responsibility for X in the attributive
sense be at least a necessary condition for the application of a moral
norm to do X? Or must the norm be prior to and independent of the
responsibility?
Suppose that I am in a position of responsibility for someone being
misled or not by an action of mine. The misleading can be attributed to
22.
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me if it occurs. Is the fact that I am in a position to be responsible for
misleading someone a necessary condition for the application of the duty
to me of not misleading that person? In this case, this appears to be so.
The reason is that the duty is precisely a duty not to responsibly mislead
someone. Without responsibility, I cannot violate this duty.
But injustice can occur even if no one is responsible for it. For
example, suppose we set up a system of criminal trials that is the best
system humans can establish. It tends very strongly to punish the guilty
and acquit the innocent, and it does better on this score than any
alternative available to us. Still, some innocent persons are punished, and
some guilty persons are not punished. We know that this will happen,
but we cannot do better given the cognitive limitations of human beings.
And of course we do not know when we are punishing the innocent,
though there is a clear fact of the matter. Though we cannot do better
than have a system that in effect punishes some innocent persons, and
the punishment of the innocent cannot be attributed to any flaw that we
can do better on, we still think that those innocent persons were treated
unjustly. We cannot be held responsible for the punishments of the innocent
because the punishments are performed non-negligently and in ignorance.
But there has been injustice.
Another example of this is the case of fair division. Suppose two
persons create a pair of valuable objects, and that they are equally
deserving of the value produced. But let us further suppose that the
goods are unequal and indivisible. One must come away with more than
the other, and there is nothing that can be done about it unless both
objects are destroyed. I think that most of us can see that the resultant
unequal distribution of the objects is unjust to some degree. And both
persons would experience some regret at the way the goods were
distributed even though they could not be distributed in a fairer way.
Lifeboat cases have a similar structure. One person among five must
die if anyone is to survive. The group draws lots to select that person,
and that person is then thrown overboard. Every person who survives
will regret that a fairer way of distributing the burden was not available,
and that one person had to assume the whole burden of saving the group.
That sense of regret, I affirm, cannot be explained but by the sense that
they fell short of the ideal of justice through no fault of their own.
In these cases, we experience the sense of falling short of the ideal of
justice even though we know we could not have done better. We cannot
attribute responsibility to any person or group, yet there is injustice.
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Moreover, the same sense of justice guides us to do the best we can and
gives us the residual sense of injustice. Here the norm of justice is prior
to and independent of any attribution of responsibility, but at the same
time it is the norm that guides our actions to the extent that we are responsible.
Justice gives us a measure to which we strive to approximate as much as
possible but from which we know we will sometimes fail to achieve.23
Let us focus on another aspect of Nagel’s argument: Because I am
expected to cooperate willingly with the state’s action, I must be given a
good reason for doing so.24 And because many others must cooperate,
they must all be given good reason for cooperation. Now the thought
seems to be that a state that permitted some to be worse off than others
for no good reason would in some way be violating this constraint, even
if there was no problem with some people being worse off than others in
the absence of state action. So although inequalities among the peoples
of the world are of no moral significance, similar inequalities among
fellow citizens would be of great importance. Let us see if we can
understand this idea intuitively. Suppose we see two people in a park
who are not related to one another; one person has a big piece of cake
and the other has a little piece of cake. We may think that there is no
problem here. But now suppose the very same two people come to me
and ask me to distribute a third piece of cake between them. I have no
good reason for giving more to one than the other, so I divide the cake
equally. And if I were to distribute the cake unequally between them,
perhaps I could be charged with a bit of arbitrary behavior.
This looks like it is pushing in the same direction as Nagel’s argument.
But it is not clear how far this goes. For suppose that one of the persons
is nicer to me than the other is, and I give that person more than I give
the other. If there is no problem with the inequality per se, then why
does this not constitute a good enough reason for the unequal division?
Or suppose I was in a hurry and cut the cake somewhat unequally as a
consequence. If there is no problem with inequality, would there be any
other problem here?
Perhaps the thought is that if I make the cut based on an invidious
distinction between the two, I am acting wrongly. If I give more to one
than the other on the basis of race or gender alone then perhaps I have
acted wrongly, despite the fact that we might not be concerned about an
inequality between these two if we did not think it was based on the
invidious distinction. Still, this does not give us a concern for inequality,
only for invidious discrimination.
23. I develop this case in a paper with Will Braynen, Inequality, Injustice and
Leveling Down, RATIO (forthcoming 2008).
24. See Nagel, supra note 9, at 129.
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Does it make a difference that we are talking about the state? Surely it
must make some difference. The state is supposed to be a kind of
impartial arbiter among the persons who come under its jurisdiction. So
reasons like a state official liking one person more than another usually
do not have any weight. But suppose the state intends to act on the basis
of minimal morality—say of noninterference and nonharming as well as
minimal beneficence—that Nagel thinks holds in the absence of the
state.25 And suppose that it does actually protect people in accordance
with minimal morality by not taxing and regulating behaviors very much.
And suppose furthermore that the consequence is a lot of economic
inequality. In addition, suppose that there is no reason to be concerned
with inequality per se. When the state justifies its system of law to each
citizen, it cites the minimal morality and its minimal demands on persons.
It says that it protects everyone’s basic rights, and it fiddles as little as
possible with the social order that arises from this arrangement. In the
absence of the state, people’s basic rights would be less well protected.
And so each person has good reason to go along with the state’s action.
And if the state is correct in its assessment that as little fiddling as
possible is desirable, then it would seem that the inequalities are not
arbitrary. They are generated in accordance with an impartial standard
and on the basis of no invidious distinctions.
I do not see what is wrong with this picture. No new principles need
emerge beyond the fact that the state is acting in accordance with
minimal morality. The appearance of arbitrariness can be fully dispelled
if we accept the conception of morality the state is acting on. And if
there is nothing wrong with inequality of distribution, there can be no
basis for criticism here. Everyone is treated as an equal citizen to the
extent that everyone’s rights are protected, and no one is interfered with
on any basis that is not common to all.
To be sure, I ought not to allow things to go on in my name that are
immoral. But I do not see why libertarianism does not fit the bill here. I
ought not to be coerced and subjected to authority for immoral aims and
purposes. Once again, the libertarian can give an account of this. So
can a liberal egalitarian.
The basic thesis I want to uphold here is that there are no new or
distinctive fundamental moral principles that arise in political justification
within a political community. The state’s actions ought to be justifiable,
25.

Id. at 126–27.
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to be sure, but the principles by which this justification proceeds are not
unique to the context of state to citizen. No new principles arise just to
enable the state to justify its actions to its citizens.
The position Blake and Nagel defend sees at least certain basic moral
principles as only coming into play in the context of a certain kind of
political community. They insist that in the context of the modern state,
the state owes a certain kind of justification for its actions to its citizens
by virtue of their being subjected to its authority and it acting in their
name. Again, I see that the state’s actions and authority should be
justifiable, but I do not see why the justification need proceed on the
basis of anything other than the correct moral principles for the case. So
if, for example, some version of libertarianism is correct, then the state
must justify its actions on the basis of libertarian principles. Or, if some
variant of egalitarian liberalism is correct, then the state must justify its
actions on the basis of these latter principles.
But the basic idea is that only if equality matters independently of the
state can it become a standard with which to evaluate the state. Thus,
the idea is that a cosmopolitan principle comes first, and the state is
charged with the job of trying to realize, to the best extent it can, justice
among persons. And the Nagel and Blake method of arguing that equality
of distribution matters in the domestic case amounts to the proverbial
pulling a rabbit out of a hat.
As far as I can see, the only things that have really changed with the
introduction of the modern state are the facts that people are faced with.
People ought to have an equal say in decisions regarding the modern
state because the modern state is, for most, a community in which people
have roughly equal stakes; decisions must be made for the community
concerning how it ought to be arranged, and people have interests in
their judgments being respected. Furthermore, because the governmental
institutions of the state are very powerful, a healthy skepticism about
human motivation should make us insist on all the rights associated with
the rule of law and due process. But these facts do not bring with them
new moral principles.
II. COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE
Moral cosmopolitans must determine the role of states as we currently
know them within a cosmopolitan order. In my view, states as we know
them have a large role to play in the development of a more just
cosmopolitan order. The first thing that states attempt to do is establish
justice among a limited set of persons. This is the Lockean aspect of the
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state that is relevant to cosmopolitan concerns.26 States, through their
systems of criminal and civil justice, property, taxation, and limited
redistribution, attempt to realize a kind of justice among their citizens.
The law of a political society is not merely a means to the realization of
justice; it establishes justice among persons for practical purposes.
Because of the legal framework, certain things count as my property
while other things do not. I am entitled to some things, but not to others.
When persons take away things that belong to me by law, we rarely
discriminate between a legal wrong and a moral wrong. The law performs
this function for a variety of reasons. First, we need to coordinate on the
same set of rules; natural justice does not give us enough information to
achieve this coordination. Second, there is a substantial amount of
disagreement about what natural justice requires, and we must have
some way of resolving the matter so as to live together reasonably well.
Again, a set of rules is often a kind of coordination point for the society.
But it is a complex coordination point that cannot merely be arrived at
by persons acting without the benefit of an authoritative rule giver.
These problems are resolved by means of a system of known and
“settled” law, as Locke put it.27
To be sure, states make law in very different ways, but more and more
states are becoming democratic. This is important because law is made
in a way that accommodates a wide variety of interests in society, at
least in moderately democratic societies. Ideally, law is made in a way
that enables persons in the society to have a roughly equal say in at least
the whole package of laws. This gives a kind of legitimacy to the law
and the state because it ensures that when there is substantial disagreement
on political matters, the great majority of people have some input in
those areas that matter to them most, and individuals are treated as
equals in the process of resolving those disagreements.28
So states establish justice among their citizens, and democratic states
do this in a way that brings a large number of citizens into the process
and gives each an equal say in that process. This makes outcomes
legitimate even when there is a substantial amount of disagreement

26. See LOCKE, supra note 3, at 395–99.
27. Id. at 396.
28. For further elaboration and arguments for these claims, see THOMAS CHRISTIANO,
THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITS (2008) [hereinafter
THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY], and Thomas Christiano, The Authority of Democracy,
12 J. POL. PHIL. 266 (2004).
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concerning their justice. Many states have developed extremely sophisticated
and relatively egalitarian methods for accommodating the interests of
their members and for discussing alternative proposals for law and policy
in the process of establishing justice. They have developed complex systems
of deliberation and accommodation in the functioning of their civil
societies. And these systems act with a fair amount of success. The evidence
for this is quite strong. Democracy tends to be a very strong predictor of
the production of public goods in society and the protection of civil
rights. And it tends to be a strong predictor of higher overall levels
of well-being in society, measured in standard ways.29 Democracy
also seems, though this is more controversial, to improve the plight of
the poor in those societies and lessen overall inequalities.30
So the conception of political community elaborated here is distinct
from that of the contractualist or nationalist conceptions and the more
instrumentalist conception common to many cosmopolitans. On one
hand, political communities do not generate new standards of morality
that are not present independent of the state. I attempt to make a case for
this in my discussion of the contractualist approaches to political
community.31 On the other hand, political communities are not mere
instruments of justice. They do not have the function of realizing justice
everywhere and anywhere. Political communities, in my conception,
attempt to bring about a just order among a group of persons. The
standards of justice are independent of political community, and the job
of the political community is to realize those standards to the extent
possible within a community of persons. They attempt to do this by
accommodating the many disagreements people have over justice in a
way that itself is reasonably just—that is, democratically.
For these reasons, in my view, the ultimate political aim for humanity
as a whole must be a global political community. Only a global political
29. There is a great deal of empirical research on these topics. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI
ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN
THE WORLD, 1950–1990, at 216 (2000); CHARLES TILLY, DEMOCRACY 185 (2007).
30. See Walter Korpi & Joakim Palme, The Paradox of Redistribution and
Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western
Countries, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 661, 676 (1998), for evidence that tax and transfer systems
in welfare states significantly reduce the GINI coefficient of inequality for these
societies. See also Marc Gradstein et al., Democracy and Income Inequality: An
Empirical Analysis 2–5, 9, 21–23, 31–35 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 2561, 2001), for a more nuanced argument. For some skepticism, see Adam
Przeworski, Democracy, Equality, and Redistribution, in POLITICAL JUDGMENT: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF JOHN DUNN (Richard Bourke & Raymond Geuss eds., forthcoming 2007).
See also PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 29, at 237, 270, for the thesis that democracies
help the poor. For a contrary opinion, see Michael Ross, Is Democracy Good for the
Poor?, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 860, 860–72 (2006).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 12–25.
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community can realize justice as much as possible among all the persons
in the world. Only it can create a just global order. But this ultimate
aim is very far off, to say the least. Those who worry that such an order
would be tyrannical are right to worry about it in the short run. Such an
order must be constructed very slowly and carefully. A premature
construction of a global political community would probably be a
disaster. But we do not have reason to think that a global political
community, when constitutionally limited and federally structured, could
not be a success in the long run. We have seen the development of very
large and reasonably successful democratic states. We are witnessing
the gestation period of what may become a very large political
community in Europe, and we are seeing the development of large-scale
regional economic associations in every part of the globe. There are
some reasons for hope here, but we must not hurry these developments
lest we undermine this progress.
To be sure, a global political community is not necessary to start on
the most pressing problems of global poverty and inequality. The
development of more partial global institutions can help with these. The
World Trade Organization helps with the alleviation of poverty through
the expansion of trade. And for those many cases in which trade is not
sufficient for the relief of poverty and disease, some modest redistribution
of wealth may be possible through international institutions in the short
run. But this is only a start, and these more modest institutions in general
require democratic states for their sustenance.32
From a cosmopolitan standpoint, there are two main limitations to
even the best democratic states. First, democratic states are mostly
pretty imperfectly democratic, and they are certainly imperfectly just.
Second, the scope within which each contemporary state establishes
justice is limited to a small proportion of the population of the world.

32. Egalitarians are not committed to any particular institutional mechanism for
the achievement of equality, although I think a political society ought to be ruled
democratically. See CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 3.
Some think that free markets are the best means for bringing about greater equality; but
recent empirical evidence shows that free markets are not sufficient to increase equality
or even to alleviate the condition of the worst off in the world. See, for example, DANI
RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 154–62 (2007), and JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC
POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 195–96, 281–82 (2005), for some of the many empirical
arguments for supplementing free trade with other programs.
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Still, this is no mean achievement when we consider what most of
human history has been like for people.
Again, an understandable cosmopolitan impulse is to try to extend as
far as possible the justice establishing powers of states, or at least to
make reasonably just and prosperous states open to everyone. But the
question we must focus on here is whether these are feasible aims in the
near term. It has taken a great deal of time just to develop the reasonably
prosperous and moderately just states that exist, and it has taken a great
deal of time to turn these into democratic states. Any sudden and very
substantial expansion of powers, population, and citizenship would not
constitute trivial changes and could do great damage to the states as we
know them and their modest capacities to bring justice.
I want to bring out some additional features of democratic states that
are important from a cosmopolitan standpoint. First, democratic states
have been relatively successful at negotiating treaties with each other on
a wide variety of different issues of great importance and following them
to a significant degree. Democratic states have negotiated significant treaties
on international trade that increasingly restrict their freedom of action.
They have also created a variety of international organizations that
constrain them in a number of ways. Second, democratic states are often
thought to be more law abiding members of the international system for
a variety of reasons including their internal respect for the rule of law
and the prevalence of a variety of active interest groups.33 Third, an
important feature of democratic states from a cosmopolitan standpoint is
that they represent a wide variety of interests during the process of
negotiation. Not only are treaties negotiated with the idea that they will
be complied with, but the negotiating partners represent the different
interests in their societies in the process.
To be sure, the representation of interests in the process of negotiating
international treaties is currently very limited in many democratic states.
Negotiations are still carried out by the executive branch of the government
and its foreign policy establishment, which tends to be undemocratic
because it has traditionally been associated with war making and forming
alliances. As international treaties become more and more invasive in
the societies that make them, this relatively nondemocratic character of
negotiation will have to give way to a more democratic practice.
The representative character of democratic states in the process of
international negotiation is, I think, one of the keys for a moral
cosmopolitan to the making of progress towards a more genuinely
politically cosmopolitan world. It is through the negotiations of democratic
33. See Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 75, 77, 83–85 (1998).
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states that international institutions are created and maintained and
global public goods can be produced. Ultimately, it is through these
negotiations that political institutions of a regional and then global scale
can be produced. But it is only through these democratic states that the
interests of a large majority of people can be accommodated in the
process of creating international institutions. Again we can see this kind
of development in the rise of regional economic alliances among states
in which states are giving up some elements of their sovereign powers to
the larger entities.
The other key towards a cosmopolitan political order that genuinely
represents and accommodates a large proportion of the world’s population
is that the negotiations among states must be carried out reasonably
fairly. That is, states must avoid exploiting one another and taking
advantage of each other’s most serious vulnerabilities in the process of
negotiation. The element of fairness is not something I will dwell on in
this paper, partly because there is little yet in the way of theorizing about
fairness in international negotiation, and partly because it does not have
as much bearing on the topic of immigration. But this is absolutely
critical in thinking about the normative features of international negotiation
and essential to understanding the complaints that poorer and smaller
states have made about the international system over the last twenty
years.34
The conception of political community that I wish to defend here
accepts that the ultimate moral principles for the evaluation of the
international order are cosmopolitan. But it also accepts that modern
democratic states are the institutional lynchpin in the development of a
just cosmopolitan political order. Modern democratic states attempt, with
some success, to extend the reach of social justice and legitimate
institutions to large numbers of people, though still only to substantial
subsets of the world’s population. They are extremely sophisticated
systems for discussing alternative views of justice and fairness and for
accommodating the many interests of their publics. In that respect, they
are models—even though very imperfect—for the realization of social
justice on a much larger scale than the nation states. They are also the
main engines of the development of international institutions and the

34. I discuss some of these issues in further detail in Thomas Christiano, Democratic
Legitimacy and International Institutions, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., forthcoming 2008).
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principal supporters of these institutions. In some cases, they have
turned over significant powers to transnational institutions. So while the
reach of the modern democratic state is limited, it promises to expand so
as to increase the reach of social justice.
The essential point here is that the modern democratic state is
necessary to expanding the reach of social justice through international
institutions. Without the democratic state, it is simply not clear that
these institutions will develop, or at least that they will develop in a
direction that can create a constitutionally limited, federally structured
democratic cosmopolitan political order. So the modern democratic
state is both an important achievement in the development of political
systems and an essential basis of progress towards a just cosmopolitan
order.
III. IMMIGRATION AND COSMOPOLITANISM
If we are to look at the question of immigration from a cosmopolitan
standpoint, we must think about it not from the standpoint of any
particular society but from the standpoint of the world as a whole. I
agree with Joseph Carens that there is nothing in the existence of
political borders that can justify the fact that some are born into
circumstances in which they have ample opportunities to live good lives,
and others are born into circumstances in which they have very few such
opportunities.35 This inequality of opportunity remains morally problematic
even though the inequality holds across different political societies. I
have argued above that we cannot give less weight to this inequality
merely because it occurs across borders. And I think moral cosmopolitans
must be concerned with ways of trying to alleviate these inequalities.36
One very natural response to the inequality of opportunity that we see
in the international realm is to open up borders so that those with inferior
opportunities in their own political societies may avail themselves of
opportunities in other societies. This would by no means equalize
opportunities because the cost and difficulty of migration would still be
very high. Indeed, it seems clear to many observers that it is not the
world’s worst off who migrate; they lack the resources to do so. It is
those who have significant resources who try to migrate. But still, open

35. See Carens, supra note 1, at 26–27.
36. This is another premise that I do not have space in this paper to defend. See
Thomas Christiano, A Foundation for Egalitarianism, in EGALITARIANISM: NEW ESSAYS
ON THE NATURE AND VALUE OF EQUALITY 41, 41–81 (Nils Holtug & Kasper LippertRasmussen eds., 2007), for a full-dress defense of equality and a response to fundamental
objections. See also CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY, supra note 28, at 12–
45.
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borders would go some distance towards improving the opportunities of
many of the world’s poorest. This seems to be the strongest argument
for the position of open borders.37
In my view, in addition to the fundamental cosmopolitan adherence to
equality of opportunity, there are two types of considerations that ought
to shape our conception of immigration. First, we must find a way to
accommodate the needs for immigration of those of the world’s poorest
who are trying to emigrate. I think nearly everyone agrees on that. Both
Michael Blake and David Miller have argued that all people ought to be
able to live in circumstances in which they can make an adequate living.38
And they both agree that immigration is part of the means by which this
can be achieved.39 Of course, this does not require that every state need
open its borders to everyone. It requires a kind of sensible coordination
among relatively wealthy states on immigration policies that will alleviate
some of the world’s most serious poverty. And for this we will need
international institutions.
The other type of consideration I have in mind follows from my
discussion above about the necessity of the role of modern democratic
states in developing a just cosmopolitan order. And here all I can do is
express some anxieties about open immigration, which seems to be the
natural starting point for a cosmopolitan view. The main idea is that it is
acceptable to limit immigration if such limitations are quite important to
the maintenance or proper functioning of the democratic states, and having
open immigration would constitute a serious threat to the democratic
state. A threat to the proper functioning of a democratic state involves a
threat either to its constitutional structure or its ability to carry out some
of the main functions democratic states have been able to successfully
carry out over the last century, most particularly over the last half century.
A threat to the constitutional structure of democracy is an obvious threat
to democracy, but I would contend that a threat to at least the most stable
activities that democracies have been able to carry out is also a threat to
democracy. The most stable activities of democracy are ones that have
withstood the test of time and thus are ones that seem to have the
strongest support from democratic societies. A threat to these activities
37. See Carens, supra note 1, at 25–26, 32 (arguing that open borders would help
to equalize opportunities for the world’s poorest inhabitants).
38. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 200; Michael Blake, Immigration and Political
Equality, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 963, 973 (2008).
39. See MILLER, supra note 5, at 225; Blake, supra note 16, at 236.
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would seem to show that something has gone wrong with the democratic
society, at least prima facie.
There are three types of reasons why this kind of limit is to be respected.
First, democracy has an intrinsic value in that it realizes a fundamental
kind of equality of concern for the interests of the persons who are
citizens of the democracy. In pluralistic societies, in which there is a
substantial amount of disagreement on how best to organize the society,
democracy gives each an equal say and legitimizes the outcomes of
decisionmaking. Second, democracy is a fairly reliable instrument for
the advancement of the well-being of persons who are members of the
society. It is a fairly reliable protection of human rights among persons
within the society, and the absence of democracy is a fairly reliable
predictor of large-scale human rights violations. In addition, democracy
is fairly well-correlated with the advancement of the material well-being
of the members of society, and the absence is correlated with the opposite.
These last two considerations are merely values to be counterbalanced
with the important values that may be realized by greater openness of
borders to immigration. And they are problematic because they seem to
give license to many of the wealthier societies in the world to avoid
important action to help alleviate poverty. Supposing that open immigration
really would pose a threat to democracies, limitations on immigration
preserve the benefits of those who are members of these societies by
excluding those who are not beneficiaries. It simply looks like a license
for the haves to exclude the have-nots. Nevertheless, these are not
unimportant values and they ought at least to be taken into account.
The main argument I want to propose for the protection of democracy
is based on the importance of democracies to the long run establishment
of a just cosmopolitan order. To put the argument in the crudest possible
form, the idea is that if democracies are essential to the long-term realization
of a just cosmopolitan order, and if open immigration would threaten
democracies either in constitutional structure or proper functioning, then
open immigration amounts at most to a short-term gain at the expense
of much greater long-term gains. It amounts to killing the goose that
will lay the golden egg in the long run.
What are the threats that I have in mind when it comes to democracy?
One major category of considerations that people have discussed in
recent empirical work is, broadly, threats to trust in democratic societies.
The basic idea is that democracies function well to the extent that the
members of the society are able to trust one another. Trust is an important
good in a democracy because the majoritarian character of democracy
implies that there are winners and losers on almost all issues. If the
losers in a democracy do not trust the winners, they may be disinclined
to shoulder the burdens that a democratic society inevitably imposes on
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everyone. And if there is widespread distrust, it may be that most would
not be willing to shoulder the burdens and sacrifices essential to the proper
functioning of a democratic society. A further consequence of distrust
could be the failure of democracies to carry out the aims that they have
pursued for a long time. In some cases, this might involve the inability to
pursue public goods. In other cases, this may involve undermining the
modest redistribution that takes place in a democratic state. And it
could involve undermining the basis of the welfare state in democratic
societies, which has been able to protect many of the worst off from
calamity and has been able to smooth out the boom-bust cycles typical
of pre-welfare state capitalism. All of these activities require a considerable
amount of cooperation and willingness to shoulder burdens, which may
be undermined by lack of trust. At worst, the consequence could be the
collapse of the democratic order itself.
How is immigration related to this concern for trust? The idea has
been that a sudden, very large influx of persons into a society from a
different society with different traditions may increase the level of distrust.
This is the result, not necessarily of xenophobia, but of misunderstanding
and uncertainty as to whether the new group is really willing to
participate in the society. A great deal of diversity, brought about by a
rapid influx of persons from another society, could therefore conceivably
lead to distrust.40
A second possible mechanism is that persons may simply not be
willing initially to undertake great sacrifices on a continuous basis for
people who are very different from them and who do not share a
common history or culture. Here the mechanism is simply from cultural
or ethnic diversity, to lack of identification, to lack of solidarity or
unwillingness to undertake sacrifices for the benefit of others.41

40. See David Miller, Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship, J. POL. PHIL. (forthcoming
2008). For some economic research, see Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, Who Trusts
Others?, 85 J. PUB. ECON. 207 (2002). For the effects of diversity on the production of
public goods, see Alberto Alesina et al., Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions, 114 Q.J.
ECON. 1243, 1251–53 (1999), and Eliana La Ferrara, Solidarity in Heterogeneous
Communities, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY VERSUS ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY 69, 69–78
(Philippe Van Parijs ed., 2004). For a good critique of some of the more philosophical
arguments, see Arash Abizadeh, Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural
Nation? Four Arguments, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 495, 500–02 (2002).
41. See Philippe Van Parijs, Cultural Diversity Against Economic Solidarity, in
CULTURAL DIVERSITY VERSUS ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY 371, 377 (Philippe Van Parijs ed.,
2004). For the opinion of a highly informed observer that large-scale migration into

957

CHRISTIANO.PRINTER.DOC

11/25/2008 1:59:11 PM

A third possible mechanism that may lead to undermining democratic
institutions or the normal functioning of democratic institutions is simply
lack of understanding. Lack of understanding due to basic differences in
conceptions of society and justice or lack of understanding due to linguistic
misunderstanding42 could also lead to a significant undermining of the
activities of the democratic state.
All of these mechanisms can damage the more formal aspects of the
democratic process as well as the willingness of people to abide by its
results, but they can also damage the informal part of democracy which
consists of its political parties, interest group associations, and other
elements of civil society so essential to the maintenance of a democratic
society.
I want to distinguish this concern from a concern for xenophobic
reactions within the receiving society. To be sure, xenophobia does seem to
play a role in reactions to immigration. But it is hard to allow that this
should be a legitimate motive for excluding people. Of course, if xenophobia
were a major factor in producing reactions among the receiving society,
we might still wish to limit immigration on these grounds. But this
would surely be a concession to the devil. I think that the trust argument
does not rely on such a crude and morally problematic motivation. The
trust, identification, and misunderstanding arguments rely more on the
understandable and morally not so problematic phenomena of uncertainty
and misunderstanding.
The thought is that if large-scale immigration into certain states were
to undermine the trust, identification, or mutual understanding necessary
to sustain the proper functioning of democratic institutions, this would
be a good reason for limiting large-scale immigration. It would be a
painful one, and it might have the appearance of being a merely selfserving policy. But the idea here is that modern democratic states are
essential elements in progress towards a cosmopolitan political order
that brings justice to everyone. Nondemocratic states are not as likely to
bring about powerful international institutions, nor are they as likely to
maintain those institutions when the institutions constrain them. As a
consequence, a threat to the proper functioning of democratic states is a
threat in the long run to the realization of a cosmopolitan political order
and therefore also a threat to the realization of justice among all persons.
Once again, if the worry about immigration undermining trust is justified,

California has weakened its support for the public school system, see Christopher Jencks,
Who Should Get In? Part II, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 20, 2001, at 94, 102.
42. Dominique Schnapper, Linguistic Pluralism as a Serious Challenge to Democratic
Life, in CULTURAL DIVERSITY VERSUS ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY 213, 213 (Philippe Van
Parijs ed., 2004).
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then large-scale immigration for the purpose of achieving greater justice
would be self defeating.
Another possible threat to democratic government could come, I suppose,
from a large influx of people who are completely unfamiliar with
participating in democratic government. This too would need to be explored
because the societies from which large-scale immigration would seem to
derive are ones with relatively weak democratic traditions.
The empirical evidence for these claims is slim and uncertain.43 And
there seems to be some evidence to the contrary, such as the evidence
from studies of transitions to democracy from authoritarian societies.
These do not give great importance to shared culture or ethnicity in the
generation of successful democracies.44 So the evidence is unclear. But
it does seem to me that these are the kinds of things that we should be
thinking hardest about when we think of the legitimacy of policies
limiting immigration.
IV. TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN INJUSTICES
One large question that I have yet to deal with is the issue of how to
trade off the short-term gains of open borders with the long-term costs,
assuming that we can develop an empirically defensible conception of
the long-term costs. Even if the hypotheses that open borders would
significantly undermine the functioning of liberal democratic states is
correct, and that this would in turn significantly retard or set back the
development of the international institutions which are necessary to
bring about greater justice on a global scale, we might still ask, what
principles should guide the trade-offs that are necessary to making an
43. For some further counterevidence, see Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka,
Introduction, in MULTICULTURALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE: RECOGNITION AND
REDISTRIBUTION IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 1, 22–30 (Keith Banting & Will
Kymlicka eds., 2006). See also Keith G. Banting, Looking in Three Directions: Migration
and the European Welfare State in Comparative Perspective, in IMMIGRATION AND
WELFARE: CHALLENGING THE BORDERS OF THE WELFARE STATE 13, 19–23 (Michael
Bommes & Andrew Geddes eds., 2000), for an argument that the modest immigration
into Europe has not weakened the welfare state there, although it has led to calls for
limiting immigration.
44. For an excellent review of findings and an argument that cultural homogeneity
is at least not a necessary condition for democracy, see Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Is
Global Democracy Possible? 12–14 (Mar. 26–29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/
2/7/9/pages252793/p252793-1.php. See also M. Steven Fish & Robin S. Brooks, Does
Diversity Hurt Democracy?, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 154, 154–64 (2004).
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ethically defensible choice here? When is it permissible to sacrifice some
gains to the present generation for the sake of increasing the chances of
much greater gains to justice in later generations? When is it required to
do so? When is it impermissible?
It is important to note that the problem I am outlining is not merely
one of intergenerational justice as it has come to be understood. So
understood, the issue concerns the proper distribution of goods over
generations. In the problem I am describing, the issue is complicated by
the fact that we are dealing with trade-offs between injustices in the
present and injustices in the future. To what extent is injustice in the
present justified by the desire to avert much greater injustice in the
future? This involves not only questions of intergenerational justice but
also questions of permissible or even required injustice. And we should
know that this kind of problem will be quite pervasive in thinking about
the nonideal circumstances we are in with regard to global justice. We
will need a general answer to this question if we are to face the problems
of global justice squarely.
This question is more difficult than I suggest here, where I propose
that, if the hypotheses I have outlined are true, no one would gain
ultimately from the opening of borders. But that assumes that the opening
of borders would immediately lead to the difficulties I have hypothesized.
But this is not likely to be true even in the most dire circumstances. The
likelihood is that the negative effects of open borders, if there are any,
would take a generation or so before they are fully realized. Though we
may hope that the worst off will benefit a bit in the reasonably near
future from sufficiently powerful international aid institutions, those
institutions are not likely to come under serious threat in the near term.
The main beneficiaries of the long-term development of political
institutions powerful enough to effect serious changes in the global
distribution of wealth are generations away.
I do not know how to solve this problem as a general matter, but the
following considerations seem to me to be relevant in the present
circumstances. The first thing to note is that a policy of open borders is
not likely to help the worst off in the societies we are dealing with. It is
likely to help those who have the resources that enable them to travel
long distances and enlist the help of smugglers and occasionally bribe
officials. This does not mean that they ought not to be helped. And it
does not mean that there is no injustice in refusing them entry into
wealthy societies. But the people who can be helped once the wealthy
societies can organize sufficiently well to help the global poor and
diseased are likely to be much worse off. Now I would want to say that
the injustices to the worst off are significantly greater than injustices to
those who are able to migrate. So the trade-off could well be between
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moderate injustice now versus very significant injustice in the future,
starting perhaps with the fairly near-term future. My tentative answer
for this particular case, therefore, would be that there are circumstances
which would require us to hold off the current large demand for
immigration in order to ensure that the institutions necessary to solving
some of the main problems of global justice can be put in place. We
need a much more general principle here but I am not currently able to
supply one.
V. CONCLUSION
The results of this paper are hypothetical. They argue against one
prominent strain of anticosmopolitan political thought, and consequently
in favor of the idea of open borders that is often defended by cosmopolitans.
But I find that there is one set of arguments that cosmopolitans ought to
accept if they agree with my thesis about the way in which progress to
cosmopolitan institutions must proceed. If the route to cosmopolitan
political community is through the successful operation of democracies,
then the immigration policies of democratic states must not undermine
the proper functioning of those states. If open immigration were to
undermine the proper functioning of democratic states—and that remains
a big if—then that would undermine the main route to the cosmopolitan
political community which alone can fully implement distributive justice
on a global scale.
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